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T
he federal funds rate and the discount rate are familiar
monetary policy terms. Textbooks typically describe
Federal Reserve monetary policy in terms of setting a
policy target for the federal funds rate, often guided by a Taylor
rule–style equation. Texts also discuss the discount rate, the rate
of interest charged to banks and other depository institutions on
loans they receive at the Fed’s discount window. Today, the Fed
offers three discount programs: primary credit, secondary credit,
and seasonal credit, each with its own interest, or discount, rate.
The implementation of monetary policy in developed
economies, in addition to a policy target rate and one or more
discount rates, features a third, less-discussed interest rate—the
“remuneration rate,” which is the rate of interest the central bank
pays on the deposits that banks hold at the central bank.1 This
interest rate, through its interaction with the policy target rate
and the primary credit, or discount, rate charged on borrowings
from the central bank, is important in the implementation of
monetary policy. The interaction among the three interest rates
results from an unusual aspect of central banking: Central banks
can simultaneously affect (and sometimes closely control) the
supply of and demand for deposits at the central bank. The
monetary role of deposits held at the central bank is to settle
interbank claims arising from the exchange of goods, services,
and real and financial assets. The overnight interest rate on such
deposits is an important element of monetary policy.
In the past, central banks imposed statutory reserve require-
ments to increase the stability and predictability of demand for
deposits at the central bank. Today, many central banks do not
impose such requirements; when they are imposed, the rates are
modest. The European Central Bank, for example, imposes a 2
percent requirement. The Federal Reserve imposes a graduated
set of requirements, depending on a bank’s deposits. In the
United States, however, retail deposit sweep programs have
allowed many banks to reorganize their balance sheet so they
are unaffected by statutory requirements.2 The demise of statu-
tory reserve requirements was brought about largely by two
factors. First, statutory requirements place affected banks at a
competitive disadvantage. This was a minor issue when regula-
tion limited the scope of competition among financial institutions,
as the requirements’ cost tended to be offset by the economic
rent created by regulation. Second, statutory reserve requirement
systems tend to be expensive to administer; they require col-
lection of large amounts of data and careful monitoring of the
eligible assets that banks hold.
The remuneration rate provides an alternative tool for a central
bank to manage the demand for deposits held by banks at the cen-
tral bank. The experience of non-U.S. central banks suggests two
things: (i) a relatively high elasticity of demand for such deposits
with respect to the gap between the remuneration rate and the target
policy rate; and (ii) the potential for a small (or zero) gap to increase
the smooth operation of a nation’s payment system. Deposits dou-
bled at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand when it reduced the gap
to near zero. As a benefit, its payment system operated more
smoothly: The larger quantities of deposits at the Reserve Bank
eased timing mismatches of payments among banks. In addition,
day-to-day variation in overnight interest rates decreased. For many
central banks, minimizing daily variation in overnight rates increases
the predictability of the cost of payment-settlement funds and is an
important ingredient in a smoothly functioning payment system.
The Federal Reserve currently is prohibited by law from pay-
ing explicit interest on deposits held at the Federal Reserve, a pro-
hibition that will end in 2011. The Wall Street Journal reported on
May 7, 2008, that the Board of Governors recently initiated discus-
sions with Congress to end the prohibition sooner, perhaps by year-
end. Today, approximately 60 percent of these deposits are not
remunerated, and 40 percent are remunerated at a rate somewhat
less than the federal funds rate. These latter deposits are ones that
banks have voluntarily agreed to maintain at the Federal Reserve,
in excess of any necessary to meet statutory reserve requirements,
to facilitate payments. Remuneration is paid in “earnings credits,”
which may be used to defray the cost of financial services purchased
from the Federal Reserve. These credits expire one year after issue
and may not be converted into cash. A more flexible remuneration
environment likely would provide the Federal Reserve a new, more
flexible policy-implementation tool similar to those of many other
central banks.
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